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Abstract 
In a purpose of a safe system design, the SASHA project partners, through the 
graphical software arKItect® have implemented a design process coupling the system 
engineering process with the safety engineering process. They address especially 
automotive area through the ISO 26262 standard that appears as an answer for a 
unified requirements set to fulfill in the purpose of safe vehicle design. The cited 
standard needs a combined approach to be implemented (workflows, administration, 
models representation. This paper aims at showing how this safety engineering process 
is integrated in the whole system design process as proposed and implemented in 
SASHA project including the system specifications phase and the system design 
process. This enables to perform the system risk analysis, which is the second step in 
the safety engineering process.  
Keywords: system modeling, safety engineering process, safety analysis, system 
architecture, integration of systems and safety engineering 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The ever increasing complexity of nowadays 
systems requires adapted method to master their 
design and development along the whole life cycle. 
In the automotive area, risks are very difficult to be 
managed due to the huge set of possible sources of 
hazards. The vehicles systems complexity, the 
interaction with the driver (or other persons) and the 
influence of the external environment (like road 
profile and weather) are possible threats to efficient 
risk management. In addition to great hazards 
variety, vehicle failures consequences can lead to 
physical injuries and even more.  This context shows 
the need of an efficient method to design safe 
vehicles. 
In automotive sector, the number of safety critical 
functions is increasing, especially vehicle dynamic 
controls, driver assistance functions and the 
introduction of mechatronics in braking, steering or 
motor control. As a result there is a need for an 
improved structured approach in development phase 
to overcome additional complexity. Indeed, 
functional safety needs to be included at a very early 
stage in the development process of systems and 
their components.  
To tackle these challenges, automotive industry 
partners currently set up the ISO 26262 
standard[13], detailing an automotive safety lifecycle 
supporting the development of road vehicles. This 
standard built upon IEC 61508 [14], focuses on 
Electric/Electronic (E/E) Systems but provides a 
general framework for safety-related systems 
design. 
The ISO 26262 standard gives recommendations 
about the whole life cycle process and steps in 
various areas like life cycle management, concept 
phase, product development (software/hardware) 
and production. One remaining issue, when vehicle 
assembler or vehicle systems manufacturer wants to 
apply this standard, is that no application method is 
available in the standard texts. So the issue intended 
by the collaborative project SASHA (Safety Check 
of Automotive Software, & Hardware 
Architectures) is to offer an implemented method 
that ensures, when applied, that the designed 
system is conforming to the standard. 
This paper, organized into three main sections, 
attempts to illustrate key features on the standard 
ISO 26262 as designed and implemented in project 
SASHA using the software arKItect®
1
. The first 
section is dedicated to show some key issues in 
safety engineering and the key features of ISO 
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26262 standard. It illustrates nowadays industrial 
practices, several recommended practices and some 
implementation/deployment requests. The second 
sections makes a focus on arKItect® technology and 
the third shows how the standard was implemented 
and deployed in SASHA project. The fourth section 
presents the results of this approach for one of the 
main car industry actor, Delphi. The paper ends with 
some conclusions and perspectives. 
2. Key issues in safety engineering 
Safety engineering efforts are most effective when 
begun early in the system life cycle. However, in 
industrial projects, most of the safety engineering 
effort is usually deferred until late in the project. This 
is due to practices that emphasize the functional 
process at the beginning of the design, reducing the 
safety role, until a decision to expand system safety 
effort is taken. Besides, this often yields to a 
discontinuity between the system design and the 
safety engineering process.  In a very competitive 
context characterized by systems complexity 
increasing coupled with time/costs pressure on 
systems development, the use of structured methods 
to complex systems design becomes unavoidable. 
Incremental complexity of actual industrial systems 
and their integrated multidimensional modular design 
has led to the need of an optimization of the design 
process to get “the right product at the right time”. 
The application of efficient requirement management 
processes in industrial environments hits against 
many threats. Most of existing practices disconnect 
the functional-based system design and its 
associated process (the system engineering 
process) and the dependability-based system design 
and its associated process (the safety engineering 
process). Moreover, it not unusual in current 
practices to see functional analysis, that has been 
performed (or should have been performed) during 
the system design phase, being performed again by 
during the dysfunctional analysis. It is mainly due to 
the fact that the framework used does not support 
both. This sometimes leads to incoherence between 
the functional analysis and the dysfunctional 
analysis. 
An integrated system/safety engineering process 
seems to be the only way nowadays to reach an 
efficient and optimized design. When performing 
such a process, the coupling of both processes and 
the interactions between them rise as the central 
issue that deserve particular attention all over the 
development process. [1] [2] [3] Thus, it is needed to 
clearly define the integrated process as follows: 
- Define clearly the steps of the system engineering 
process 
- Define clearly the steps of the safety engineering 
process 
- Define clearly how these two processes are related 
to each other 
- Identify the documents that need to be generated 
- Define a unique referential for the integrated 
process 
3. Environment and Tools 
To give answer to the issues stated above, SASHA 
project partners, through the graphical 
representation tool (arKItect®) and their 
experiments, proposes a solution for both efficient 
and seamless system engineering and safety 
engineering. This solution is “system architecture 
centric” which means that all activities related to the 
system design and to the dependability analysis are 
gathered in the same representation space. The two 
main items of this proposition are:  
1. Keep close connections between all activities of 
the system design/development (including 
requirements management, functional architecture, 
system architecture, ready-to-simulate models, etc.) 
and of the dependability analysis (including customer 
risk analysis, preliminary hazard analysis, system 
risk analysis, fault tree, FMEA) [4] [5] [6] 
2. Offer a more ergonomic and intuitive human 
interface  
This paper presents an implemented solution to 
perform an efficient dependability analysis during the 
whole system design cycle. It explores several axes: 
the system engineering process which is based on 
the INCOSE system engineering handbook, and the 
safety engineering. Through these axes, a focus is 
done over the functional analysis, the dependabilty 
analysis, their associated working/filter views and 
scripts that generate and update documents 
automatically. 
This paper explains the integrated process shown in 
Fig.1: 
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Figure 1 Integrated Process for System Engineering and Safety Engineering 
 
The Essentials Systems Engineering Process has 
been divided into two sub-processes: (1) System 
Specifications and (2) System Design. The System 
Specifications subprocess contains, firstly, the phase 
of Customer Needs Analysis detailed in terms of 
system life cycle definition, requirements statement, 
functions identification and functions definition tasks. 
Secondly, we find the Functional Architecture phase 
decomposed into the tasks of requirements and 
functions refinement, and sub-functional flow 
exchanges definition. The System Design 
subprocess contains a System Architecture phase 
consisting of system definition, functions allocation to 
systems, physical interfaces definition and flows 
allocation, and requirements allocation to systems. 
However, there is a feedback connection from the 
requirements allocation upon systems in the System 
Architecture phase to the requirements refinement in 
the Functional Architecture phase: the allocation of 
various design requirements to the system 
components can lead to the generation of further 
functional requirements.  
The proposed environment also covers Customer 
risk analysis phase which is linked to the functions 
definition in the system specifications phase. This 
phase includes the system state definition, the 
preliminary risk analysis (where risks are linked to 
functions), the system risk event identification, the 
UCE (undesired customer event) identification and 
the UCE quotation. It finally also covers the system 
risk analysis phase which is linked to the internal 
functional analysis in the system engineering 
process. It includes the fault tree building where risk 
events and basic risk events are identified on the 
system architecture resulting from the system 
engineering process, the FMEA (which consists in 
identifying components possible failures, associated 
risk events, failure analysis and corrective actions) 
and the complete fault tree view. [7][8] As arKItect® 
is a tool aimed at facilitating the tasks of systems 
(and safety) engineers, the automation of 
calculations and report generation has been given 
special attention. Moreover, arKItect® can easily be 
used to provide diverse customizable views on the 
system and its safety aspects. These two practical 
advantages are detailed in the following chapter.   
4. ISO 26262 
 
ISO 26262 Presentation 
ISO 26262 standard is the adaptation of IEC 61508 
in automotive industry. It sets out the automotive 
approach for all safety lifecycle activities for safety 
relevant systems comprised of electrical and/or 
electronic components. This Standard addresses 
possible hazards caused by functional behavior of 
safety related systems due to malfunctions and does 
not address non-functional hazards due to technical 
realization as well as nominal performance level of 
systems, independent from the existence of 
dedicated functional performance standards. 
The ISO 26262 standard compiles the following key 
features: 
• adopts a customer risk-based approach for the 
determination of the risks; 
• provides a specific automotive method analysis to 
identify the safety integrity level of each undesirable 
effects (means for a vehicle function, identification of 
the consequences of one or some fault / failure, 
leading or possibly leading to a customer claim, or a 
damage to the environment, up to significant 
damage or harm); 
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• uses safety integrity levels for specifying the target 
level of safety integrity for the safety functions to be 
implemented by safety related systems; 
• provides requirements for the whole lifecycle 
(engineering, production, operation, maintenance, 
decommissioning) necessary to achieve the required 
functional safety. 
 
ISO 26262 Implementation in arkitect® 
To comply with the SASHA project purpose, and 
consequently to be able to implement a life cycle 
process that complies with ISO 26262, the work was 
divided into Three main steps. Fig.2. illustrate the 
summary of these steps. The central idea is to 
implement the requirements stated in the standard in 
form of a meta model using arKItect® tool. The 
resulted meta model (or one of its representations) 
shall be reviewed and proved by certification 
experts/organizations and then it can be instantiated 
in a specific projects. We can note here that the 
main effort turns around the definition of the 
appropriate meta model. 
 
Fig.2. Main Steps for ISO 26262 standard implementation 
 
Step 1: It consists on reading and translating the 
standard texts into a meta model. Some key issues 
have to be taken in account. First of all, the standard 
steps in all the life cycle. It contains requirements 
affecting a very large variety of activities like the 
management process (users, administrators, and 
responsibilities), the workflow, software/hardware 
products and suppliers. Another aspect to deal with 
concerns some requirements to be fulfilled without 
any indication about the way to do. The 
implementation means are considered as out of 
scope of the standard. The controllability, the 
external risk reduction  and the use of “other 
technologies ” are some examples of this situation. 
The needs in this step are: 1) a powerful and flexible 
representation tool, and 2) a good understanding of 
the standard. The item 1) is resolved thanks to 
arKItect® characteristics. The item 2) is addressed 
by the expertise offered by the SASHA project 
partners. 
Step 2: The resulted meta model have to be certified 
by experts/organizations that can stamp the 
compatibility of the decisions made on the meta 
model and the requirements stated in the standard. 
To do, a complete traceability between the standard 
requirement and the resulted Meta Model (containing 
all the life cycle processes) is made and the 
documentation is generated and produced as proof 
of the matching between the expected results (stated 
in the standard) and the solution (supported by the 
Meta Model) 
 
Step 3: the application of processes (the use of the 
Meta model) ensures the compatibility of the 
designed product with the requirement stated in the 
standard. That means, once the two previous steps 
fully completed, the automotive projects that have to 
comply with ISO 26262 can simply use the produced 
Meta Model and by the way they can be ensured by 
the compliance of the project products with the 
safety objectives of the standard. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the Safety Add-on package, the Customer Risk 
Analysis phase is implemented using Preliminary 
Hazard Analysis (PHA). PHA has been decomposed 
into the tasks of system risk event identification, 
undesired customer event (UCE) identification and 
UCE quotation. The Customer Risk Analysis phase 
also includes the system states definition task as 
these states need to be linked to the UCEs along 
with top risk events stemming from the system 
functions. As PHA is based on information on the 
system functions, the external functional analysis—
definition of system service functions and 
constraints—constitutes its pre-requisite.  
In practice, PHA is implemented as a defined set of 
objects and their interrelations in the Safety Add-on 
meta-model: we have notably objects of types 
Failure Mode, Top Risk Event and Undesired 
Customer Event. The Failure Mode flows (containing 
information such as no function, lost function, 
User / 
Admin 
Workflow 
Model 
Standard (ISO 
26262) 
Project 
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untimely function activation and deteriorated 
function) are produced inside the service functions of 
the system (as defined in the Functional Architecture 
phase) and the information contained in these flows 
is passed on to the Top Risk Events at the system 
level. Afterwards, the Top Risk Events and the 
system states can be combined to produce 
Undesired Customer Events at the oversystem level.  
In the System Risk Analysis phase, we have chosen 
to implement two widely-used tools: Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA). These two tools can be used 
independently—it is possible to perform one analysis 
or the other, or both if desired. The fault tree building 
task consists of defining risk events, detailing them 
in terms of basic risk events and connecting the 
whole via logic gates; the fault tree is constructed on 
the system architecture.  
In FMEA, component failures are linked to risk 
events while each failure can become the object of 
detailed failure analysis and corrective action 
planning. The basic object type of the Safety Add-on 
implementation of FMEA is an information flow 
called FMEA Failure. This flow originates in the 
faulty component and connects to a higher level Risk 
Event. Of course, a Risk Event can receive 
information from several FMEA Failures.  
The failures can be further analyzed via Failure 
Analysis objects containing attributes such as cause, 
effect, severity, probability of occurrence, means of 
detection, non-detection rating and a Risk Priority 
Rating (RPN). These attributes can be assigned 
values and thus permit to characterize the Failure 
Analysis in detail. In addition, it is possible to define 
corrective action via a Corrective Action object also 
found inside the FMEA Failure. Corrective Action is 
defined in terms of attributes such as the action 
description, its deadline, the person responsible for 
the action as well as new severity, non-detection and 
RPN ratings after the correction. The Corrective 
Action object is connected to the corresponding 
Failure Analysis via a Failure Action flow.    
As FTA and FMEA are both based on the system 
architecture, internal functional analysis should be 
completed (or should at least be worked on in 
parallel) before these safety aspects are studied.    
arKItect® Safety Add-on also contains special views 
for visualizing chosen safety aspects. The fault trees 
are constructed in a specific view permitting to 
visualize the FTA objects as well as the system 
architecture. FMEA also has its dedicated view 
based on system architecture and the FMEA 
components. In addition, there is a fault tree 
synthesis view permitting to visualize the constructed 
fault tree in its entirety (along with the event 
probabilities) without the hierarchical system 
architecture levels. There is also a combined FTA & 
FMEA synthesis view displaying the components of 
the FMEA along with the fault tree events. 
In the Safety Engineering Process, it is possible to 
use scripts included in arKItect® Safety Add-on to 
calculate fault tree probabilities as well as to provide 
an FMEA synthesis. The fault tree probabilities are 
defined as attributes in the various fault tree objects 
(Basic Events, Risk Events and Top Risk Events) 
and the rules of the calculation by are set by the 
logic gates (AND Gates and OR Gates).   
In the same manner as in the Safety Engineering 
process, it is possible to generate deliverables via 
architect® Essentials scripts during the Systems 
Engineering Process: these deliverables include 
reports on the external and internal functional 
analyses as well as function and component trees.  
5. Discussion 
PHA, FTA and FMEA are the tools that were used in 
our integrated approach. Traditionally, system 
developers are not familiar with system safety 
analysis processes which are performed by safety 
engineers. One reason for this is the gap that exists 
between the traditional development processes, 
methodologies, notations and tools and the ones 
used in safety engineering. Although they have been 
used for decades, they were not coupled with tools 
usually used for system engineering. These tools, 
such as those supporting SysMl  and Doors , are not 
adapted to such an integrated approach. [10] 
SysML
1
: While it covers many aspects of system 
engineering process, it needs to be modified to cover 
safety engineering process. This gap makes the 
development of safety aware systems a very 
complicated task. It is mainly due to the rigidity of its 
metamodel (limited number of diagrams that cannot 
be customized). [9] 
Doors
2
: While it covers mainly the requirements 
management process, it is not a graphical tool, 
making system engineering non intuitive. Moreover, 
it is impossible to perform a safety analysis using it. 
It is due to the fact that it is a textual tool. 
 
The SASHA project (Safety Check of Automotive 
Software, & Hardware Architectures) provides a 
more appropriate response to automotive needs. Its 
purpose is to model both the process of designing a 
safety case, and at the same time, a description of 
multi-level system hierarchy. The Delphi's strategy is 
to integrate innovative 
2
results from this project and 
make them generic on his product lines. 
 
                                                          
2
 SysML, http://www.omgsysml.org/ 
2 
DOORS, http://www-
01.ibm.com/software/awdtools/doors 
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Indeed, the DELPHI product development is based 
on Automotive SPICE [11] repository. The 
Automotive SPICE, derived from the ISO/IEC 15504 
standard, is an international standard which has 
been developed by consensus of the car 
manufacturers. It is used when performing 
conformant assessments of the software process 
capability of automotive suppliers.  At specification 
level, we use tools as Reqtify
1
 and DOORS for 
requirements capturing. At design level, our 
application layer software components are modelled 
using Simulink
3
 from which AUTOSAR compliant 
code is generated. Some safety analyses [12] are 
performed using FTA and FMEA methods. But it 
represents just a small part of the IS026262 
functional safety framework. 
 
For optimal integration of a safety assessment in our 
development process, it was necessary to 
understand the gap between the technical reference 
and SPICE process. So, the detailed description of 
IS026262 contents realized in SASHA allows 
identifying by a mapping on current DELPHI 
process, different steps and work products not yet 
filled to achieve the compliance with the new 
standard. 
 
The idea is not to start from scratch. From that, 
actions have been taken to update our development 
project methodology. This requires in first time 
improving of the assessment framework, either by 
modifying SPICE process to make it compliant to 
ISO26262 when the activities are already present, 
either outright by the addition of new activities that 
are not at all previously treated.  
For testing the accuracy of the new methodology as 
well defined, its deployment on Simulink 
implementation built around an example of a diesel 
engine control with the possibility of verifying 
hardware and software during the design of 
components is being performed with arKitect®. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We have presented here the Safety Engineering 
Process of the Safety Add-on and its interactions 
with an overarching Systems Engineering Process. 
All in all, the arKItect® software together with the 
Essentials meta-model and the Safety Add-on permit 
easy and convenient integration of the systems and 
safety engineering processes. Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis can in this manner be built on the system-
level functional architecture while Fault Tree 
Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis can 
                                                          
1
 Reqtify, http://www.geensoft.com/en/article/reqtify 
3
 Simulink, 
http://www.mathworks.co.uk/products/simulink/ 
 
be performed in parallel to the system architecture 
definition. As a visual tool, arKItect® enables the 
representation of these safety aspects in a graphical 
and easily-understandable manner. Special views 
can also be created to visualize the chosen safety, 
functional and organic aspects of the system. In 
addition, the automated calculation of fault tree 
probabilities and the generation of FMEA tables 
facilitate the analyst’s task.  
This paper aims also to address a very practical 
issue in the automotive area which is to find an easy 
way to achieve a high safety level by fulfillment of 
the ISO 26262 standard requirement and, in the 
same time, mastering the costs due to this 
standardization. The proposed solution is based on 
applying a combined process which includes safety 
items and functional activities. The aimed process is 
modeled in a certified Meta model that insures, if 
correctly applied that the instantiation (some project) 
called also “Safety Case” complies automatically 
with the standard and so achieve a safe functional 
design. 
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